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1. “Public Domain” in “PGRFAs”1: An Overview
I start this comment with the overview of “public domain” in relation to Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (PGRFAs). What is basically 
challenged under arguments beneath the ‘public domain’ is the claim of 
proprietary right by private entities over knowledge that is created or derived
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from common resources with the purpose of regaining access to such common 
resources or claiming the share of the benefits derived by the private entity. 
Strathern notes the challenge stating that a resource belonging to the public 
domain remains in such domain, and underlines that “once public, it cannot be 
subject of proprietary claims”.2
The ‘public domain’ in relation to intellectual property rights is claimed to be 
‘(unlike the commons), a residual category created by intellectual property 
regimes themselves’ and that it is often confused with the ‘commons’.3 
Horowitz asks “if the public domain is nothing more than the holes in the 
intellectual property system, why reify it with theory and metaphor?” Still, 
Horowitz seems to endorse the answer from Boyle that ‘language matters’ which 
emanates from the fear that the ‘commons’ are in danger of ‘enclosure’.4 If we 
allow the ‘property-centered approach to information’ it will certainly make ‘the 
public domain’ disappear from the public consciousness.5
Most notably there is the danger that: “well-organized groups (such as the 
pharmaceutical companies) with stable, substantial and well defined interests 
face off against diffuse groups (the public) with high information costs whose 
interests, while enormous in the aggregate, are individually small”.6 
Accordingly, this would result in an increased exclusion of the public by such 
‘enclosure’ of the ‘commons’ and the need arises, at least, to maintain a public 
space that enables ‘free access’ if reclaiming of the ‘commons’ proves to be 
impossible.
Various scholars try to come up with different definitions for the ‘public 
domain’ depending upon what each perspective wants to justify. The competing 
interests and perspectives can, for instance, be in favor of intellectual property 
rights or in pursuance of limiting the extent of such protection.7 Although 
definitions are surrounded by ‘metaphor’, the “public domain’ can be described 
as:
...an institutional space, where human agents can act free of the particular 
constraints [such as property rights] required for markets, and where they
2 M. Strathern (2006). ‘Intellectual Property and Rights: Anthropological Critique’. In 
C. Tilley et al. (eds.) Handbook of Material Culture: Sage, p. 453.
3 Ibid.
4 S. J. Harowitz (2009). ‘Designing the Public Domain’.Harvard Law Review [Online]. 
Vol. 122, No. 5.[Accessed 7th Jan, 2010], pp. 1491. Available from World Wide Web: 
< http:// www.ssrn.com>
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 See J. Boyle (2003). ‘The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the 
Public Domain’. Law and Contemporary Problems, 66 (1&2), p. 60.
have some degree of confidence that the resources they need for their plans
will be available to them.8
It may, however, be questioned as to whether the ‘public domain’ is the same as 
the concept of the ‘common heritage’ of mankind referred above as ‘commons’. 
Chander and Sunder argue that this concept may not be as romantic as we think.9 
The mere fact that a resource belongs to the commons does not necessarily mean 
equal sharing in the utilization of such resources. According to Strathern, 
“common property rights imply co-equal ownership of rights, not equal shares to 
resources...”.10 Co-equal ownership rights in the form of group or ‘corporate 
entity’ gives individual members of the group the right to usufruct. How such 
usufruct rights may be managed could be diverse which likely impacts the 
sharing of the resource owned collectively. Thus, the ultimate surety that the 
group can get is that “the group’s ownership cannot be extinguished by the 
actions of individuals”.11
One noteworthy point, to be drawn from Strathern, is that we find a different 
notion in the concept of ‘public domain’ that it inherently endorses the existence 
of some form of private proprietary ownership and tries to save for the public a 
common pool especially on areas where public interest is dominant. In this 
regard, it is important to take note of Boyle’s suggestion to be wary of long 
standing critics of ‘anti-commons’ that work in favor of enclosure since such 
claim of inherent endorsement could work in favor of more enclosure of the 
‘commons’ to the private domain.12
Predominantly, what lies at the heart of the controversy resulting from claim 
of proprietary rights by private entities and subsequent denial of the public from 
access to such knowledge or resources is the issue of regaining ‘access’. Hence, 
an effort to carve out a public domain would be the logical next step to be taken 
towards attaining this end. Such effort in relation to Plant Genetic Resources for 
Food and Agriculture (hereafter, PGRFAs) can be specifically appreciated to 
ensure access to such resources (e.g. seeds) for farmers against a claim of 
proprietary right by private entities that deny farmers their access to plant 
genetic resources or specifically PGRFAs.
Unfortunately, as Andersen states, legal restrictions on access to genetic 
resources have intensified the problem of the current genetic erosion in crop
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8 Harowitz (supra note 4).
9 A. Chander & M. Sunder (2004). ‘The Romance of the Public Domain’. California 
Law Review: Vol. 92, No. 5, p. 2.
10 Strathern, supra note 2, p. 454.
11 Ibid.
12 Boyle, supra note 7, p. 36.
Comment 371
varieties which heightens food insecurity.13 14 These restrictions are of two forms: 
“intellectual property rights to plant genetic resources, and acts and regulations 
at the national level in a range of countries governing access to genetic
”14resources .
The controversy between patents or plant breeders’ rights and regulation of 
access to plant genetic resources entails two forms of denial of access. The first 
factor relates to national regulation denying access to plant genetic resources 
from the centers of origin15 such as Ethiopia. This is exacerbated by the 
diversity of those multinational companies and research centers even if this can 
be a moot issue considering the weaker bargaining position of developing 
countries. The second factor in the denial of access is the grant of exclusive 
monopoly rights (patents or plant breeders’ rights).
Both forms of denial denote that any person must make payment in order to 
get access to plant genetic resources. While the status quo of plant genetic 
resources is in a state of devastating erosion, grants of such intellectual property 
rights deny the wider public and mainly farmers access to varieties that are 
collected or to varieties derived from the plant genetic resources available in the 
open source without any form of benefit-sharing.
Arguments based on the public domain ‘theory’ cannot be raised to get rid 
of intellectual property right claims and protection over plant genetic resources 
by private entities especially if we submit to Strathern’s definition of the public 
domain as ‘a residual category’ that inherently endorses private monopoly 
rights. Such arguments may, however, be helpful in carving out a domain that 
enables free access to the ‘public’.
The question that comes into one’s mind will then be how it would be 
possible for the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture (ITPGRFA) to ensure access to PGRFAs within a system that grants 
an exclusive or monopoly right over plant genetic resources to a private entity.
2. Background on PGRFAs
The International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources (IUPGR) was FAO’s 
effort (in 1983) to potentially go beyond ensuring access to plant genetic 
resources and make a stronger claim of treating all plant genetic resources 
(PGRs) as “common heritage” of mankind. It was a non-binding instrument
13 R. Andersen (2003). ‘FAO and the Management of Plant Genetic Resources’ In O.
Stokke & 0. Thommessen (eds.), (2003/2004): Yearbook of International Co­
operation on Environment and Development. London: Earthscan, p. 2.
14 Ibid.
15 See <http://www.ibc.gov.et/biodiversity/components-of-biodiversity/plant-species- 
diversity>.
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which did not provide for a public domain treatment but rather “took the position 
that all PGRs were to be treated as the common heritage of mankind”.16 It 
provided broad definition of “common heritage” that included commercial plant 
varieties protected by plant breeders’ rights and plant patents in some 
jurisdictions and multilateral treaties of the developed nations. The underlying 
motive was that “if the PGRs of the developing world were freely appropriable, 
so too should be the proprietary varieties of the developed countries”.17 The 
International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources (IUPGR) never got wide 
acceptance (or failed) to culminate into a binding treaty mainly due to clear 
difference of the positions of the developed and developing countries.
Then, followed the negotiation, known as the “keystone dialogue”, between 
the developed and the developing countries that resulted in “a recognition by the 
developing countries of the validity of IPRs [Intellectual Property Rights] in 
plant varieties” and that “common heritage” or free accessibility to and 
appropriation of farmers’ landraces located in developing countries by 
developed countries did not mean access free of charge.”18 The focus of the 
dialogue in the international regimes, afterwards, was channeled to the issue of 
ensuring access and benefit sharing which was promoted by developing 
countries after having submitted to the validity of IPRs in plant varieties during 
the keystone dialogue.
The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) addresses the issues of 
access to genetic resources. Although it does not specifically refer to PGRFAs, it 
allows countries to put conditions for access based on “environmentally sound 
reasons” since the convention is mainly concerned about the conservation of 
biodiversity.19 It also recognizes the sovereign rights of states over their PGRs20
On the other hand, the TRIPS (Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights) Agreement under the World Trade Organization’s legal regime demands
16 M. Blakeney (1998). ‘Access to Biological Resources: Domestic and International 
Developments and Issues’.MUEJL [Online].Vol. 5, No. 3.[Accessed 7 Jan, 2010], 
p. 4. Available from World Wide Web:
<http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v5n3/blakeney53.html>
17 K. Aoki & K. Luval (2007). “Reclaiming ‘Common Heritage’ Treatment in the 
International Plant Genetic Resources Regime Complex”. Michigan State Law 
Review: Vol.1, p. 41.
18 Ibid.
19 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD): Rio de Janeiro, (1992), Article 15. Also 
see: Varella (2003). Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit Sharing: Main Aspect of 
Some Legal Frameworks. Open meeting of the Global Environmental Change 
Research Community: p. 9. Available from World Wide Web:
<http:// www.ssrn.com/abstract=674502>
20 Aoki & Luval, supra note 17, p. 49.
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protection of plant varieties by patents or sui generis system of protection (or a 
combination of the two). 21 UPOV (International Convention for the Protection 
of New Varieties of Plants) has been considered by developed nations as a 
model for sui generis (“of its own kind”, i.e. a similar protection to patent right) 
as its provisions favor the interest of the developed nations. Provisions of UPOV 
provide protection similar to patent and most of UPOV members are 
industrialized countries.22 In 2001, some amendments were, introduced23 based 
on the ‘keystone dialogue’.
3. The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for 
Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA)
The objective of the treaty is the conservation and sustainable use of PGRFAs 
and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of their use so as to 
ensure sustainable agriculture and food security.24 The ITPGRFA establishes a 
MLS (Multilateral System under ITPGRFA) as a “communal seed treasury”.25 
Under Annex I, it specifies list of “most central food plants”26 that are in the 
MLS and in the public domain as envisaged in Article 11.2. As Rosendal notes:
... the material, it is agreed, must remain freely available and not become 
subject to patents ‘in the form received’ from the FAO multilateral system, 
that is, international gene banks (Article 12.3). It is meant to contribute to 
securing farmers’ rights to use and reuse their seeds and to retain access to 
breeding material.27
The presumption is that there would be no Intellectual Property Rights to claim 
without some modification to the PGRFAs. This is because PGRFAs “in the
21 WTO (1994), Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS), Geneva: WTO, Article 27.3 (b).
22 “Intellectual Property Rights: Ultimate control of agricultural R&D in Asia” 
<http://www.grain.org/article/entries/30-intellectual-property-rights-ultimate-control- 
of-agricultural-r-d-in-asia>, p.6
23 Aoki & Luval, supra note 17, p. 53
24 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
(ITPGRFA), Article 1.1.
25 L. R. Helfer (2004). ‘Intellectual Property Rights in Plant Varieties: International 
Legal Regimes and Policy Options for National Governments’. Food and Agriculture 
Org. of the United Nations, FAO Legislative Study, No. 85, p. 87.
6 G. K. Rosendal (2006). ‘Balancing Access and Benefit Sharing and Legal Protection 
of Innovations from Bioprospecting - Impacts on Conservation of Biodiversity’. The 
Journal of Environment and Development [Online].Vol. 15, No. 4.[Accessed 
December 31st, 2010], p. 434. Available from World Wide Web: <http:// 
jed.sagepub.com>
27 Ibid.
form received” from such MLS are in the public domain.28 The 
commercialization of PGRFAs “in the form received” from the MLS entails the 
obligation to share the benefits thereof with the contracting parties.29
In order to ensure the “facilitated access”, the ITPGRFA provides for the 
material transfer agreement (MTA); an agreement between a “provider” and 
“recipient” which the GB (Governing Body under ITPGRFA) adopts.30 More 
specifically, “MTAs include a provision that prohibits commercial use of the 
material transferred, as well as further transfer to third parties. Almost all of 
the MTAs include a provision regarding intellectual property rights, with a view 
to either restrict protection by the recipient of the accessed material as such, or 
establish a benefit sharing scheme in events where accessed material or related 
traditional knowledge is improved,”31
The major shortcomings of ITPGRFA in promoting the public domain for 
PGRFAs are as discussed below.
a) The Listing in Annex I of ITPGRFA
Where ITPGRFA recognizes the sovereign rights of states over their own
32PGRFAs , it is not clear why the “negotiated listing” of PGRFAs has excluded
33PGRs that may be essential for a certain state’s food security. It has “notably” 
excluded PGRs such as “soybean (four instances), tomato (three), sugarcane
(two), cassava (two), palm oil tree (two), peanut, groundnut, cucumber, pepper,
34and pear” and that the listing in Annex I is “too limitative” . Article 11.1 states 
that the listing in Annex 1 is based upon “criteria of food and security and 
interdependence. A point to note is that such exclusion goes against the very 
objective of the treaty especially when a certain essential PGR, “ought to” fall 
within PGRFAs’ category. Such exclusion errodes ITPGRFA and indicates the 
difficulty to negotiate on specific listing of PGRFAs. 28 29 30 31 32 33 34
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28 C. R. McManis (2007). ‘Facilitated Access and Benefit Sharing under the New FAO 
Treaty: The Interface of Open-Source and Proprietary Agricultural Innovation’. 
Washington University - IPSC: p. 7. Available in [PPT] from World Wide Web: < 
http://
www.law.depaul.edu/centers_institutes/ciplit/.../ppt/Charles_McManisPPT.ppt>
29 ITPGRFA (supra note 24), Article 13.
30 Ibid, Article 12.4.
31 M. Lightbourne (2006). ‘Survey on the Concurrent Implementation of the FAO Treaty 
on Plant Genetic Resources and of Intellectual Property Rights’. Intellectual 
Property Quarterly. Vol. 2, p. 132.
32 ITPGRFA (supra note 24), Article 10.1.
33 McManis, supra note 28, p. 4
34 Lightbourne, supra note 31.
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b) Article 12.3 (b), ITPGRFA
This provision completely denies facilitated access to a country that cannot 
afford to pay such minimal fee. Thus, it retards the public domain by denying 
access to PGRFAs that are regarded by the treaty as falling within the public 
domain.
c) Access to individual farmers and breeders
This issue seems to have been neglected or otherwise intentionally left out from 
the treaty. As it is closely related to the purpose of the access sought to be 
facilitated in ITPGRFA, the issue needs examination of the phrase in Article 
12.3 (a) which reads “[a]ccess shall be solely for the purpose of utilization and 
conservation for research, breeding and training for food and agriculture...”. The
provision tries to prevent access to those who may want to directly use the
35PGRFA for non-food industrial uses. The treaty, i.e. ITPGRFA should have as 
a matter of purpose ensured and promoted access to seeds (as Plant Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture) for farmers and breeders as long as it is not 
used for direct commercial purpose. As the treaty is drafted on the basis of 
recognition of the sovereign rights of states over PGRs, it should not have been 
silent regarding issues relating to individual access. Unlike Helfer’s 
assumptions, it may not be plausible to take a presumption that access is insured. 
In the absence of such access facilitation, the effort to carve out a public domain 
for PGRFAs seems to be largely unsuccessful, and the MLS (Multilateral 
System under ITPGRFA) should have embodied a mechanism to monitor states 
to this end in.
d) Benefit sharing mechanism
Once it is established that the listed PGRFAs are in the public domain, it follows 
that there is open access and that the commercialization of such PGRFAs entails 
a duty to share benefits. Article 13 provides for such arrangement. In fact, the 
fund from the benefit sharing will be used “to promote conservation and 
sustainable use of plant genetic resources, particularly by farmers and 
indigenous communities, whose rights and contributions the ITPGRFA 
expressly recognizes”35 36 37 Since the focus of this comment is mainly on facilitated 
access to PGRFAs, I do not deal with benefit sharing in detail. But, two 
important points should be noted.
First, the provision has adopted mechanisms of benefit sharing such as 
exchange of information, access to and transfer of technology, capacity building,
35 “...provided that such purpose does not include chemical, pharmaceutical and/or 
other non-food/feed industrial uses”, “ITPGRFA (supra note 24)”, Article 12.3 (a).
36 Helfer, supra note 25.
37 Ibid.
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and sharing of monetary and other benefits of commercialization. These are 
mainly difficult to implement due to their vague nature and their dependence on 
the will of states. The second problem relates to the phrase in Article 13.2(d)(ii) 
which reads “...shall pay ... except whenever such product is available without 
restriction to others for further research and breeding...”. This stipulation relives 
intellectual property right holders in PGRFAs of the obligation to share the 
benefits from commercialization merely because it is made available without 
restriction to others for further research and breeding. Various Non­
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) argue that this would harm the MLS 
(Multilateral System under iTPGRFA) because it takes away the minimum fund 
(0.77% of the selling price) needed for strengthening the system.38
e) Ambiguous issues in Article 12.3(d) of ITPGRFA
McManis points out two ambiguous issues in Article 12.3(d) of ITPGRFA 
(international Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture). The 
first is as to “how much of improvement or modification is required before a 
genetic component of a PGRFA is no longer “in the form received” under the 
MLS?”39 From the reading of the provision, it is clear that a recipient of 
PGRFAs cannot claim patent or PVP (Plant Variety Protection) without some 
modification or “in the form received” from the MLS (Multilateral System under 
ITPGRFA). However, the provision does not deal with how and when a PGRFA 
is said to be no longer “in the form received” from the MLS.
McManis states that the scope of this provision will be influenced by the 
interpretation of other treaty provisions such as TRIPS as envisaged in 
Paragraph 10 of the preamble of ITPGRFA. It provides, “nothing in this treaty 
shall be interpreted as implying in any way a change in the rights and 
obligations of the Contracting parties under other international agreements”. 
Accordingly, developed countries would argue (under FAO and wTO dispute 
settlement) that ‘inventions’ within the meaning of TRIPS are not genetic parts 
or components in the form received under the MLS. On the other hand, 
developing countries will likely argue that genetic components of PGRFAs are 
not ‘inventions’ within the meaning of TRIPS and thus fall within the MLS. 
Neither argument would solve the failure of the provision to provide specific 
guidelines to distinguish a PGRFA which is no longer in the form received from 
the MLS.
The second issue raised by McManis reads “under what circumstances do 
IPRs ‘limit’ facilitated access to PGRFAs?”40 It is stated in the provision that 
“[r]ecipients shall not claim any intellectual property or other rights that limit the
38 McManis, supra note 28, p. 16.
39 Ibid, p. 8.
40 Ibid, p. 8-11.
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facilitated access” to PGRFAs or their genetic parts or components”. Of the 
existing IPR forms in PGRs, PVP under UPOV or other Plant Patents have their 
own different effect on limiting facilitated access. PVPs are less restrictive since 
there is a mandatory exception such as for “acts done privately and for non­
commercial use or acts done for experimental purposes”.41 It can even arguably 
be said that PVPs do not ‘limit’ facilitated access. Patents for plants or genetic 
components are more problematic since they are governed by TRIPS.
Some may argue that ‘limited exceptions’ can be made under Article 30 of 
ITPGRFA and compulsory license issuing under Article 31. Yet, these may not 
be enough to clearly put instances that “limit” facilitated access. Even the MTA 
(Material Transfer Agreements) adopted by the GB (Governing Body under 
ITPGRFA) replicates the same problem.42 There should thus be is a clear 
demarcation of public domain which, at least, has guiding principles for 
distinguishing an IPR that limits facilitated access from one that does not. 
Otherwise, the point of carving out a public domain for PGRFAs becomes 
ineffective.
f) ITPGRFA and the Regime Complex in PGRs
The legal and practical effects of the ITPGRFA will not only depend on how 
much countries are willing to commit themselves to implementing it, but will 
also be influenced by its relationship with other agreements relevant to the PGRs 
regime such as the CBD, UPOV and TRIPS.43 Possible conflict with these 
treaties puts ITPGRFA in a weaker position of enforceability. Unlike the other 
treaties, TRIPS has ‘teeth’ whenever these treaties are in conflict, inter alia, due 
to retaliatory measures and sanctions.44
Conclusion
The need to limit exclusive intellectual property rights emanates from the ‘public 
interest’.45 To this end, the ITPGRFA (International Treaty on Plant Genetic
41 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV),
Article 15. Also see McManis, supra note 28, p. 12 
2 McManis, supra note 28, p. 16
43 C. Gerstetter et al (2007). ‘The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for 
Food and Agriculture within the Current Legal Regime Complex on Plant Genetic 
Resources’. The Journal of World Intellectual Property [Online]. Vol. 10, Nos. 3/4. 
[Accessed 15th January 2010], p. 259. Available from World Wide Web:
< http:// www.interscience.wiley.com>
44 Aoki & Luval, supra note 17, p. 55
5 C. M. Correa (2001). Options for the Implementation of Farmers' Rights at the National 
Level, 8, South Centre, Geneva: p. 3. Available from World Wide Web:
< http:// www.southcentre.org>
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Resources for Food and Agriculture) makes a prudent effort to ensure facilitated 
access to PGRFAs through MLS. It pursues a realistic approach to avoid conflict 
with the interest of developed nations while trying to facilitate access to plant 
genetic resources and to carve out the residual category of PGRFAs by giving 
recognition to plant patents and PVPs (Plant Variety Protection). However, this 
is confronted by the shortcomings discussed above which makes it self­
contradictory with its very objective. ITPGRFA is thus unable to effectively 
promote the public domain for PGRFAs in the midst of increasing pressure for 
the enclosure of biotechnology by the industrialized nations through 
international organizations such as the World Trade Organization. ____________________■
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